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"Welfare Reform" and Procedural Due
Process Protections: The Massachusetts
Example
CAROLYN GooDwINt
INTRODUCTION
The 1996 welfare reform established a new program,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),' which
significantly altered the former welfare program, Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC).' The Supreme
Court had characterized AFDC as a statutory entitlement
in the form of a property right, making constitutional
procedural due process applicable to deprivation of welfare
benefits.' When Congress passed TANF, it stated explicitly
that TANF could not be characterized as an entitlement.4
By statutorily eliminating an entitlement to welfare
benefits and consequently a property right in welfare
benefits, Congress may have deprived welfare recipients of
the constitutional guarantee of due process protections,
such as fair hearing appeals, designed to limit welfare
agency actions.5 Many recipients have their benefits
t J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2000. I wish to
thank Bob Mertz and my parents, Rhoda and Herbert Goodwin, for their never-
ending encouragement and support as well as editing assistance. I also wish to
thank Professors Susan Vivian Mangold, Jacob Hyman, and Frank Munger for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Finally, my sincere
appreciation to Mia McFarlane and Kinda Serafi for their constructive feedback
and assistance.
1. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq. (1999).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1999), amended by Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996).
3. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1999); infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
5. See Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The End of Welfare and Constitutional
Protections for the Poor: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Works Program and Due
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terminated, not as a result of any deliberate failure to
comply with requirements, but because caseworkers have
inadvertently made errors.6 A system of procedural due
process protections for welfare recipients is particularly
important to empower recipients who are generally
disenfranchised due to "race, class, or gender."7 The formal
appeals process provides welfare recipients with a voice to
challenge decisions made "by untrained, uninformed, or
biased workers at . . . governmental agencies."8 Since
recipients may no longer have a federal statutory
entitlement to welfare benefits,9 the question remains of
what will happen to procedural protections for welfare
recipients whose benefits are unfairly terminated or who, in
the wake of time limited benefits,'0 are unfairly denied
extensions of time limited welfare benefits.
In this article, I will examine some of the implications
of the new welfare law on procedural protections for welfare
recipients by looking at what has happened to due process
in the states, particularly in Massachusetts, since Congress
enacted TANF.
In Part I of this note, I explain the nature of the former
Process Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 154 (1998).
6. See Rebecca Zeitlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up To Rights: The
Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform
Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1132 (1996).
7. Id. at 1113-14 (analyzing the importance of due process protections for
women, particularly women of color, in light of recent welfare reform).
8. Id. at 1116.
9. Whether the federal and/or state courts will interpret the TANF statute
as depriving recipients of constitutional due process guarantees remains
unclear. Compare Michelle L. Van Wiggeren, Experimenting with Block Grants
and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare By Altering
Federal-State Relations and Recipients Due Process Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 1327,
1358 (1997) (explaining that "elimination of the AFDC entitlement and denial of
a federal TANF entitlement through PRAWORA do not give rise to any
legitimate due process claims; these two entitlements were terminated
uniformly by legislative action "), with Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and
State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1999) (claiming that
"federal due process should continue to protect poor people against arbitrary
governmental action even if welfare is no longer a federal entitlement.. .") and
Weston v. Hammons, No. 99-CV-412, at 19 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 1999) (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law
Review) (rejecting the argument that "when Congress specified that [TANF]
benefits are not an entitlement, it intended to prevent the creation of a property
interest and thereby prevent due process rights from attaching to the right of
any person to receive benefits").
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1999).
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entitlement status of welfare benefits that gave rise to
procedural due process protections for welfare recipients. I
also explain the framework for analyzing what level of due
process is required for deprivation of protected property
interests. I then describe changes in the welfare law which
led to the statutory elimination of the entitlement status in
the federal welfare law. I also discuss the possibility that
Congress, despite the non-entitlement language in TANF,
did not intend to eliminate procedural protections for
welfare recipients because it required states to develop
procedural safeguards.
In Parts II through IV, I examine a few state
experiences to show a selection of how state administration
of benefits and concurrent procedural due process
protections have developed since TANF." In Part II, I
provide a sampling of state welfare cases and experiences
dealing with due process rights of welfare recipients since
TANF. In Part III, I describe present welfare regulations
and concurrent procedural protections in Massachusetts. I
focus on Massachusetts because it imposes a two-year time
limit on welfare benefits, three years less than the federal
five-year maximum.12 As of December 1998, welfare
recipients in Massachusetts who had been on welfare for
two years either lost their benefits or applied for an
extension of benefits." In addition, in Massachusetts,
unlike in some states, the courts have not interpreted the
state constitution as mandating the state to provide
assistance to needy persons. 4 In Part IV, I look at the
procedural protections that attend extensions of time
limited benefits in Massachusetts to show how due process
rights have developed since TANF for a discretionary
portion of the state welfare law.
Finally, in Part V, I assume, for purposes of analysis,
11. I do not examine these states to determine whether they are providing
the requisite level of due process. An analysis of the adequacy of procedural
protections would require a determination that welfare is a protected property
interest. At present, it is unclear whether welfare benefits will be interpreted to
be an entitlement in the form of a protected property interest. See infra section
I(A) for a background of the due process analysis.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1999); 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 5 §
110(f) (West 1995).
13. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
14. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 333 N.E.2d
388, 398 (Mass. 1975).
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that there is no federal statutory entitlement, which would
create a protected property interest, in welfare benefits. I
do this to show that despite the elimination of the
entitlement status in the federal welfare law, recipients
still have avenues to secure adequate procedural
protections. I use Massachusetts procedural protections for
extensions to time limited benefits as a case study to
explore potential strategies that recipients can use to
secure due process protections, either through judicial
interpretation of state welfare laws or through legislative
actions.
I. WELFARE: ENTITLEMENT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Background to Welfare's Entitlement Status
Public assistance for needy persons existed in various
forms throughout the history of the United States." In the
1930s, the federal government assumed a central role in
providing welfare benefits by enacting public assistance
laws, including Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), as a
portion of the 1935 Social Security Act. 6 ADC was renamed
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962."
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government expanded
its involvement in welfare through a series of judicial
decisions. 8 In the 1960s, the federal courts expanded the
rights of welfare recipients, including its determination in
15. See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) (providing a history of
public assistance in the United States).
16. See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-27 1, 49 Stat. 620 (1935);
HELEN HERsHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR: THE
AUTORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO POOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 4 (1997); GORDON, supra
note 15, at 4-5 (explaining that while the Social Security Act of 1935 provided
for public assistance, it did so in a stratified manner -with social insurance
programs (including social security and unemployment compensation) as
"superior both in payments and in reputation" to the public assistance
programs (generally "welfare") which were deeply stigmatized).
17. See GORDON, supra note 15, at 1.
18. See Van Wiggeren, supra note 9, at 1332-34.
19. See id. at 1333 n.56 (explaining how the courts expanded the rights of
welfare recipients in cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(declaring unconstitutional states' imposition of one-year waiting period on new
residents otherwise eligible for welfare assistance)); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 334 (1968) (invalidating an Alabama regulation that denied needy children
568 [Vol. 48
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Goldberg v. Kelly"° that individuals who met the statutorily
defined eligibility criteria for welfare benefits possessed an
entitlement in welfare benefits.21
The Court determined that welfare benefits, as a
statutory entitlement, were property rights to be protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' As a result of the decision in Goldberg, the federal
government required states to set up a system of fair
hearings as part of their plan to administer federally
funded welfare programs.
When determining whether an individual's due process
rights have been violated, the courts apply a two-pronged
test.25 First, the court determines whether a property right
exists.26 Because of the decision in Goldberg, welfare
recipients had an entitlement, in the form of a property
right, in their AFDC benefits. 27 The second stage of the due
process analysis asks, what are the necessary procedures to
"federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a
substitute father [when in fact the children were legally fatherless]").
20. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21. See id. at 262.
22. See id. at 262-63 n.8 ("It may be realistic today to regard welfare as
more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property.") The Court goes on to quote Charles A. Reich, a legal
economic scholar: "It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized
by public policy, have not been effectively enforced." Id. (quoting Charles A.
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause is established in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as it applies to the States and
the Fifth Amendment as it applies to the Federal government
24. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71; Zietlow, supra note 6, at 1123-26.
25. See Laura Conway, Student Research: Will Procedural Due Process
Survive After Aid To Families With Dependent Children is Gone?, 4 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 209 (1996).
26. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id.; Conway, supra note 25, at 209.
27. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
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satisfy the Due Process Clause? In other words, what
process is due?"8
The courts have developed legal standards to determine
what level of due process is required for individuals
deprived of "life, liberty, or property."29 The Supreme Court,
in Mathews v. Eldridge," articulated the three factors to be
balanced in determining the level of administrative
procedures required by the due process clause. The court
must consider
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the addition or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.31
Although the level of procedural due process required for
termination of government benefits is subject to a balancing
test and is not fixed, 2 by characterizing AFDC welfare
benefits as a property right, the Court guaranteed
recipients some level of procedural due process."
B. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and the
Elimination of Welfare's Entitlement Status
In 1996, the federal government eliminated AFDC by
enacting Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996." TANF ended the
28. See Conway, supra note 25, at 209-10.
29. See id. at 209-11 (providing a general due process analytic framework);
Van Wiggeren, supra note 9, at 1357-58 (applying an overview of modern due
process analysis to welfare). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (providing an in depth discussion of due
process); Todd G. Consenza, Preserving Procedural Due Process For Legal
Immigrants Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Responsibility Act
of 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2065 (1997) (dealing with the food stamp program,
the author provides a comprehensive procedural due process analysis).
30. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31. Id. at 335.
32. See id. at 334; Conway, supra note 25, at 210.
33. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
34. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 601-619
570 [Vol. 48
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federal guarantee of assistance for needy persons by
changing the program from an entitlement program to a
non-entitlement, block-grant program." Major provisions of
TANF include a five-year lifetime limit to welfare benefits 6
(states can enact laws with shorter time limits)" and a
federal work requirement. 8
As an entitlement, AFDC guaranteed federal public
assistance to needy persons. TANF abandons that
guarantee and shifts the responsibility of designing and
administering welfare programs to the states.4  For
(1999). See Van Wiggeren, supra note 9, at 1329-35, for an historical analysis of
the context of the Act.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1999); Mary Jo Bane, Welfare as We Might Know
It, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 47-53 http://www.prospect.org/archives/
30/fs30bane.html (collected Feb. 26, 2000) (on file with the author and with the
Buffalo Law Review); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block
Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain,
14 YALE J. ON REG. 297, 303 (1996).
By contrast, entitlements versus non-entitlements programs are
distinguished in terms of beneficiaries' capacity to enforce their
interest in the states' fulfillment of programmatic promises. Crudely
put, the issue here is the degree to which statutory standards give
administrators discretion to determine a beneficiary's access to cash,
goods, or services and the extent to which those decisions are
constrained by legal remedies. The degree of legal protection is thus a
function of both the definitiveness of statutory or regulatory criteria
and the level of legal protection afforded to defend the "rights" defined.
Id.
36. See 42 U.S.C.§ 608(a)(7)(A) (1999) ("A State to which a grant is made...
shall not use any part of the grant to provide assistance to a family that
includes an adult who has received assistance under any State program funded
under this part... for 60 months (whether or not consecutive) .... ").
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(E) (1999) (stating that the law "shall not be
interpreted to require any state to provide assistance to any individual for any
period of time under the state program funded under this part").
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1999).
39. See Additional Views of Senators Moynihan, Bradley, and Mosely-
Braun, S. REP. No. 96, at 64 (1995).
The Federal Law enacted in 1935 provided the several States with a
Federal guarantee that whatever amount they provide by way of
support for dependent children will be matched, according to a formula,
by the Federal government. This is what we mean when we speak of
welfare as an entitlement. It is the entitlement of the several States to
support from the Federal government. (In the 1960s children who
meets the qualifications became entitled to receive whatever benefits a
State prescribes ....
Id.
40. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority
Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552,
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
example, under AFDC, the federal government "guaranteed
[states] the availability of funds, allowing for flexibility in
times of economic recession,"' by providing them with half
or more of the costs to provide assistance to families eligible
for the program.42 Under TANF, the federal government
essentially provides each state with a lump-sum payment in
the form of a block grant, which can be supplemented
through a system of incentives and bonuses,43  but
essentially remains at a fixed level. 4
When drafting TANF, Congress indicated that courts
should not interpret the law to provide benefits as a
statutory entitlement by stating that "[t]his part shall not
be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any State program funded under this
part."45  Congresspersons held differing views on the
potential impact of disentitling welfare. For example,
legislative history reflects that "[D]emocrats supported
retaining this [entitlement] status to protect welfare
recipients from wrongful deprivation of benefits. In
contrast, the Republicans sought to eliminate the
entitlement, believing that by doing so they would rescue
welfare recipients from dependence on government and
reduce the costs of administering the welfare system." 46
By statutorily eliminating an entitlement to welfare
benefits, it is unclear whether Congress intended to
prohibit courts from interpreting TANF as requiring
553 (1999); Jennifer M. Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence:
A Proposal for Implementing an Exception to Welfare Time Limits, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 621, 627 (1998).
41. Mason, supra note 40, at 627; see also HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra
note 16, at 34-35.
42. See Mark Greenberg, Welfare Restructuring and Working Poor Family
Policy, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 24, 25
(Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds. 1999).
43. See Mark Greenberg & Steve Savner, A Brief Summary of Key
Provisions of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant of H.R.
3734 (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996) http'//www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/clbskp.html (created Aug. 13, 1996) (on
file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review); Greenberg, supra note
42, at 30; Cashin, supra note 40, at 553.
44. See Greenberg, supra note 42, at 30 ("[Bllock grant amounts stay
constant through 2002 except for any adjustments due to bonuses or penalties.
Under limited circumstances, a state experiencing an economic downturn may
qualify for additional federal funding through a contingency fund.").
45. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1999).
46. Van Wiggeren, supra note 9, at 1338-39 & nn. 89-91.
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constitutional procedural due process protections,4" whether
it intended to transform the welfare program from a
lifetime guarantee of benefits to conditional temporary
assistance, 8 or both. Statutory and regulatory language
suggest that Congress did not intend to fundamentally alter
procedural fairness in administration of benefits. For
example, TANF requires states to develop procedural
safeguards in their administration of state welfare
programs. Under the federal regulations that govern
general administration of public assistance programs,
states must submit fair hearing plans to the federal
government for review. 9 The regulations describe the
requirements for a fair hearing and explain that "[u]nder
this requirement hearings shall meet the due process
standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and the standards
set forth in this section."50
TANF also requires states to submit plans that "set
forth objective criteria for the delivery of benefits and the
determination of fair and equitable treatment, including an
explanation of how the State will provide opportunities for
adversely affected recipients to be heard in a State
administrative or appeal process."5 Although this provision
47. Sylvia Law outlines three aspects of the entitlement concept:
First, entitlement signifies that individual poor people have a legal
right to whatever benefits Congress chooses to guarantee them.
Second, it means that once an individual has demonstrated that he or
she is entitled to benefits, when the state acts to terminate aid it must
explain the reasons why and give the individual an opportunity to
protest. Finally, the entitlement concept means that states are
guaranteed federal matching funds if they provide subsistence for poor
people who meet the qualifications of the federal Social Security Act.
Sylvia Law, Review Essay, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV.
471, 483 (1997). But see Weston v. Hammons, No. 99-CV-412, at 19 (D. Colo.
Nov. 5, 1999) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (on file with the author
and with the Buffalo Law Review) ("[T]o the extent congress did intend to
prevent due process rights from attaching, that would be constitutionally
impermissible. Congress may not create a property interest by the substantive
provisions of a statute but then defeat the right to due process merely by
reciting that there is no entitlement.").
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1999) (stating, in part, that its purpose is to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage").
49. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1999).
50. Id. § 205.10(a)(1)(ii).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (1999).
2000] 573
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may be vague, "it contains the classic due process
requirement that states provide 'opportunities... to be
heard.' ,52
By stating that TANF is not an entitlement while
requiring state plans to include provisions for appeals
processes, Congress may not have eliminated due process
requirements for administration of welfare benefits, but
rather eliminated the federal entitlement to benefits and
delegated the formation of due process requirements to the
states." In addition, TANF does not necessarily preclude
states from creating an entitlement to welfare benefits
under state law. It may only eliminate the entitlement for
the federal portion of the welfare law. 4 Although TANF
requires states to provide some level of due process, by
eliminating its entitlement status, Congress left open the
possibility that states will not create sufficient protections
and recipients will be treated in an arbitrary manner.5
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS IN THE STATES
As TANF only requires states to provide the federal
government with "objective criteria" for delivery of benefits
and an opportunity to be heard,56 states may vary
significantly in their interpretation of "objective criteria"
and consequently in their approach to fair administration of
benefits.57 In reviewing a selection of state experiences
dealing with state administration of welfare benefits and
concurrent due process protections, it appears some states
52. Van Wiggeren, supra note 9, at 1359.
53. See id. at 1361.
54. See id. at 1355.
The language [of the federal statute] only says "[tihis part"-meaning
the federal statute which creates TANF-shall not be interpreted to
create an entitlement. As a result, the statute may permit states to
create an entitlement through their own welfare laws.., because the
potential for state-created entitlements exists, the law fails to end
welfare entitlements completely.
Id.
55. See Conway, supra note 25, at 212.
56. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Janet Varon, Passing the Bucks: Procedural Protections
Under Federal Block Grants, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 233 (1983)(discussing the effects on the poor of block-grant social programs, in particular
claiming that when government has created social programs that shift control
to the states, it "has paid insufficient attention to the procedural protections
which should accompany these programs").
574 [Vol. 48
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have developed fair processes, while others operate their
programs in more arbitrary manners."
Some states have responded to the increased flexibility
in administration of welfare benefits by creating additional
safeguards against erroneous sanctions.59 For example, in a
class action lawsuit brought by welfare recipients in
Colorado, the Denver Department of Human Services
reached an agreement with the plaintiffs that it would not
impose a reduction or termination of benefits without first
providing a "Pre-Sanction Warning Letter and Notice of
Sanction Agreement," thereby strengthening procedural
protections for welfare recipients.6
In addition, caseworkers in Iowa are required to provide
additional case management services to recipients prior to
terminating their benefits for failure to comply with a
program requirement.61 In Florida, a community member
review panel offers assistance to recipients who are not
complying with program rules. 2 But in Pennsylvania, for
example, adequate procedural protections have not
developed alongside new welfare regulations.63
State constitutions and statutes affect the manner in
which states administer welfare benefits. Several state
constitutions have express provisions requiring that its
government care for its needy. 64 In states in which welfare
recipients have a state constitutional right to assistance,
due process protections are more likely to apply. In New
58. I intend to provide a sampling of some of the issues that have developed
regarding administration of benefits and due process requirements since TANF.
This section does not represent an exhaustive study of state experiences since
TANF.
59. See Robert J. Lukens & Jennifer K. Pokempner, Pennsylvania Must
Provide Additional Procedural Safeguards to Prevent Erroneous Sanctions,
http//:www.welfarelaw.org/penn.htm (collected July 21, 1999, 21:28 EST) (on
file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review).
60. See Jodie Levin-Epstein, A CLASP Report on Welfare Reform
Developments, in CLASP UPDATE, http://www.clasp.org/pubs/CUjuly99.htm
(created July 31, 1999) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law
Review).
61. See Lukens & Pokempner, supra note 59.
62. See id.
63. See id. (explaining the necessity for additional safeguards to protect
recipients from unfair termination of benefits in Pennsylvania).
64. See William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor in
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 551 (1998).
("Twenty three state constitutions recognize that someone or something in the
individual states will provide for those in need.").
2000] 575
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York-a state with a constitutional right to assistance-
welfare recipients have challenged the state's failure to
comply with fair hearing requirements. For example, in
Piron v. Wing, six individuals obtained relief after
challenging the state's failure to -promptly restore their
benefits after fair hearing victories.6 In two other New York
cases, the court found that the "City and State disregarded
'its rules, regulations, consent decrees, and due process
essentials in sanctioning petitioners [recipients] for
their alleged failure to comply with employment
requirements.' When reviewing the fair hearing decisions
which had upheld petitioners' sanctions, the court
determined the recipients had been treated in a biased
manner.
67
Despite some successful litigation, welfare recipients in
states with constitutional provisions requiring provision of
assistance, are not necessarily guaranteed adequate
procedural protections because courts may interpret the
provisions in a limited manner.' For example, courts in
New York, Kansas, and Alabama have interpreted their
state constitutional provisions that claim the state has an
obligation to care for the poor as granting the legislature
wide discretion in determining who constitutes the poor and
in what manner the state must provide for the poor."
Rather than take an active role in interpreting state
welfare statutes and defining the rights of welfare
recipients, many state courts defer to state legislative and
executive decision-making processes.
Still, other state courts have taken an active role in
interpreting state statutes, even interpreting state welfare
provisions as establishing an entitlement to welfare
benefits. For example, in Colorado, a state court judge
65. See Welfare Law Center, Litigation Docket (Nov. 1999),
http://www.welfarelaw.org/docket/docketlO.htm (collected Nov. 10, 1999, 17:09
EST) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review) (citing Piron v.
Wing, No. 401-310 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Mar. 26, 1997)).
66. Welfare Law Center, Litigation Docket, (July 1999),
http://welfarelaw.orgwebbul/99july.htm (collected Nov. 10, 1999) (on file with
the author and with the Buffalo Law Review) (citing Martinez v. Turner, Index
No. 401716198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) and Amantkvah v. Turner, Index No.
401732198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)).
67. See id.
68. See Rava, supra note 64, at 567.
69. See id. at 560-64.
70. See id. at 568.
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interpreted the state welfare benefit as a protected property
interest with subsequent due process protections, despite
the Colorado statute's claim that welfare is "not an
entitlement."' The court held that "due process applies
because under the state's welfare program benefits must be
provided to those who meet the state's requirements ...
creat[ing] an expectation of benefits for those who meet the
requirements and does not allow unfettered agency
discretion in determining who gets benefits."' While the
wide ranging implications of this decision are not known,
the decision suggests that significant protections for welfare
recipients can be achieved through state initiatives,
including judicial interpretation of state statutes and
constitutions.
Although certain state courts have ruled in favor of due
process rights for welfare recipients, absent a federal
requirement, many states have been operating their
programs in an arbitrary manner." Even in states that
retain fair hearing and other due process requirements, the
administration of the benefits can be so poor that a "new
lawlessness reigns," in which due process procedures do not
protect recipients. 4 In particular, many state welfare
administrators do not convey to welfare recipients that,
while welfare is time limited, they still have a right to other
government benefits, such as food stamps and Medicaid.7 5 A
71. Welfare Law Center, Colorado Court Rules that Due Process Applies to
TANF Benefits Despite "No Entitlement" Language, WELFARE NEWS, June 1999,
http://www.welfarelaw.orgfcoloradocourt.htm (collected Nov. 10, 1999, 17:02
EST) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review).
72. Id.
73. See generally Welfare Law Center, Due Process and Fundamental
Fairness in the Aftermath of Welfare Reform, WELFARE NEWS, Sept. 1998,
http-//www.welfarelaw.org(DueProcess.htm (collected Apr. 20, 2000) (on file
with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review).
74. Karen Houppert, You're Not Entitled! Welfare 'Reform' is Leading to
Government Lawlessness, THE NATION, http://www.thenation.com (created Oct.
25, 1999) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review).
75. See id.
But like a game of telephone, as the welfare reform message has
trickled down from Congress to governors to state legislators to
counties, cities, welfare administrators and caseworkers, it has grown
distorted. The mantra to "end welfare as we know it" has mutated into
a message that it's OK to deny all government benefits, regardless of
the protective aspects of the law (few and far between as they are).
"There is no question that there's tremendous confusion among welfare
administrators," says Ron Pollack, executive director of Families
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recent news story relayed the plight of one welfare recipient
frustrated by the inefficiencies of the system:
Gail Aska was a model [welfare] recipient. Two years ago, the New
York City resident got a job-without health insurance-and
promptly informed her caseworker .... Meanwhile her son, who
had spinal surgery a year before, needed a follow-up visit with a
doctor. To her dismay, Aska discovered that the transitional
Medicaid benefits she was supposed to be getting had been cut
off.... Somehow Aska's case had been miscoded. When she kept
insisting that she had a right to transitional Medicaid, she was
told she would get a date for a Fair Hearing, where the issue
would be arbitrated. She waited for months and months. Finally,
she gave up and applied for insurance for her son through a
separate government-funded program .... "M2y son had some
symptoms from the surgery that we needed to get checked out,"
she said. "You don't play around with that-you don't wait for a fair
hearing."
7 6
Procedural protections for welfare recipients remain critical
in ensuring that welfare benefits and other government
benefits are not unfairly denied.
III. MASSACHUSETTS WELFARE REGULATIONS AND
CONCURRENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
In the early 1990s, the Massachusetts government, like
many other state governments, began discussing changes to
state welfare laws." In 1995, the Massachusetts legislature
enacted its welfare law, later named Transitional Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC) 9 The state,
pursuant to a federal waiver, implemented most of its
provisions prior to passage of the federal welfare law. 0
U.S.A., which documented the tremendous drop in Medicaid
enrollment and the corresponding rise in uninsured children. "And
there's no question that beneficiaries are also confused about their
rights."
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. See id.; Levin-Epstein, supra note 60 (stating that the state Department
of Public Welfare in Pennsylvania reinstated Medicaid for 32,000 persons who
were wrongfully deprived of Medicaid when they moved from welfare to work).
78. See Dianne Wilkerson, Panel-Welfare/Social Justice: Where Do We Go
From Here, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. RaV. 47, 48 (1997).
79. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 118, § 2 (1995).
80. See The Family Economic Initiative and the Massachusetts Law Reform
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After the federal welfare law passed in August 1996,
Massachusetts implemented its two-year lifetime limit to
welfare benefits provision.8 The state time-limited welfare
provision took effect on December 1, 1996.2 The law sets
forth a maximum and cumulative time limit of twenty-four
months, during a continuous sixty-month period, in which
persons are eligible to receive welfare benefits." Recipients
can receive benefits beyond this time period if they fall
within an exempt category,84 are eligible for a domestic
violence waiver, or the Commissioner of the administering
agency, Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA),°
Institute Time Limit Documentation Project, Interim Report: A Closer Look at
the Massachusetts Families Hitting the Time Clock, http://www.gbls.org/
gbls/gblsweb.nsf (collected July 21, 1999) (on file with the author and with the
Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter MLRI INTERIM REPORT]; Press Release from
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Health and Human
Services, Weld-Celluci Administration Urges Feds to Act on Welfare Waivers
(June 30, 1995). Legislative history reveals that the notion of a time limited
benefit was crucial to the welfare reform package from inception. See H.B. 1444
(Mass. 1995) (marked up draft from House Ways and Means Committee); H.B.
1500 (Mass. 1995) (Welfare Bill passed in House); S. 1775 (Mass. 1995) (Senate
debate and passed Bill); H.B. 3286 (Mass. 1995) (Conference Report and
enacted Bill). House Bill 1500 had even more obtuse criteria than the later
passed House Bill 3286 for determining extensions. The granting of such an
exemption shall be solely in the discretion of the commissioner: "The
Commissioner may establish a procedure by which a recipient may request an
extension ... ." H.B. 1500 (Mass. 1995).
81. See MLRI INTERIM REPORT, supra note 80.
82. See Hilary Sargent and Judith Gaines, Sit-in at State House Urges
Reprieve of Benefits Cutoff, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1998, at B4.
83. "[A] family... shall receive assistance for not more than a maximum
and cumulative twenty-four months during a continuous sixty-month period,
unless an extension is granted by the commissioner .... MASS. GEN. LAws ch.
5, § 110(f) (West 1998); see MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.200(A) (1999).
84. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.100. Recipients may be considered
exempt if they are pregnant and in their last four months of pregnancy, see id. §
203.100(A)(1)(c), have a disability, see id. § 203.100(A)(1)(a), are needed to
remain at home to care for a relative with a disability, see id. § 203.100(A)(1)(b),
or are under age 20 and meet certain requirements, see id. § 203.100(A)(1)(b)(f).
85. See id. § 203.110; Mason, supra note 41, at 629-30 (explaining that,
under TANF, states have the option to enact a hardship and a family violence
exemption from the federal and state welfare time limits for women who are
subject to extreme cruelty and/or who are victims of domestic violence).
86. "To reflect the legislative theme that welfare benefits were intended to
be temporary, the Legislature changed the name of the administering agency
from the Department of Public Welfare to the Department of Transitional
Assistance, St.1995, c. 5, § 41 .... Minnefield v. McIntire, No. Civ. A. 99-3349,
1999 WL 823890, at *2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 1999).
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grants them an extension."
Recipients must comply with TAFDC program
requirements in order to receive benefits.8 Program
requirements are complex, including strict work
requirements," a child exclusion provision, 0 a learnfare
provision, 91 a requirement for childhood immunizations,
92
and others.93 Welfare benefits will be reduced or terminated
for non-exempt recipients who do not comply with program
requirements.94
Despite changes to federal welfare laws and state
administration of welfare benefits, since 1995,
Massachusetts has not significantly altered its regulations
prescribing the manner in which welfare fair hearings
should be conducted, except for fair hearings regarding
appeals from denial of welfare benefit extensions. 9' The Fair
Hearing Rules set forth processes for recipients should they
be unfairly sanctioned or denied benefits:
General Description of the Fair Hearing Process: The fair hearing
process is an adjudicatory proceeding whereby dissatisfied
applicants, recipients... upon written request can obtain a
determination of the appropriateness of certain actions or
inactions on the part of the Department .... The process is
designed to secure and protect the interests of both the appellant
87. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210.
88. See id. § 203.000.
89. See id. § 203.400 (requiring recipients to work twenty hours a week
unless they qualify for a categorical exemption).
90. See id. § 203.300 (excluding benefits for children born while the mother
is on welfare or has recently been on welfare).
91. See id. § 203.900 (requiring parents to provide verification of their
children's attendance in school because the state imposes sanctions if the
children fail to attend school and have no good cause reason for their absence).
92. See id. § 203.800 (requiring that children be immunized).
93. See generally id. § 203.000-203.920.
94. See id. § 203.000 (listing the requirements recipients must fulfill to
receive welfare benefits).
95. See id. § 343.000. Here is an abbreviated summary of the changes: (1)
effective April 1, 1994, "fair hearings may be conducted face-to-face, whether in
person or by video conferencing or telegraphically," id. § 343.120; (2) effective
November 1, 1995, "[tlhe Department of Public Welfare was changed to the
Department of Transitional Assistance," id. § 343.000; and (3) effective
September 18, 1998, there are now regulations regarding the appeal process for
family cap and domestic violence waivers, and an extension of benefits beyond
the twenty-four month limit, and the basis for fair hearing decisions is governed
by the Code of Massachusetts Regulations title 106, section 343.610, see id. §
343.610.
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and appropriate Department personnel... A hearing is conducted
by an impartial referee of DOH (Department of Hearings). The
decision of the Referee is based only upon those matters which are
presented at the hearing. The Referee examines the facts, the law,
and the other circumstances of the case presented by the parties to
determine the legality and appropriateness of the Department's or
the Department's employee's action or decision of the Department.
It is binding upon the Department and is not subject to any review
within the Department .... 96
The Fair Hearing Rules also include an aid pending
provision in which recipients continue to receive benefits
after they have submitted a request for a fair hearing.97
Although fair hearing requirements for time limited welfare
benefits in Massachusetts remain essentially intact,98 the
due process procedures that have developed around
extensions to the two-year time limit on welfare benefits do
not provide the same level of protection.9
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR
EXTENSIONS TO THE TWO YEAR TIME LIMIT ON WELFARE
BENEFITS IN MASSACHUSETTS
The Massachusetts welfare law grants the
Commissioner of DTA the power to grant welfare recipients
extension of benefits beyond the 24-month time period, and
requires him or her to establish discretionary criteria to
determine whether an extension of benefits should be
granted.'9  Importantly, the Commissioner need only
consider certain factors when reviewing an extension
request and is not required to base his or her decision on
whether these factors have been met.'
The Commissioner established several criteria as
96. Id. § 343.110.
97. See id. § 343.250; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)
(holding that "when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process").
98. See discussion infra part IV.
99. See discussion infra part V.
100. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210; 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 5,
§ 110(f) (West 1995).
101. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210 ("[The Commissioner shall
consider appropriate criteria...." (emphasis added); Massachusetts Law
Reform Institute, FEI Comments on Proposed FY2000 Budget, letter to
Secretary O'Leary, http://www.gbls.org/gbls/gblsweb.nsf (created Dec. 18, 1998)
(on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review).
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factors to consider when determining benefit extensions
which include: (1) whether the recipient has been
sanctioned for failure to comply with work requirements, "2
or other program rules;0 3 (2) whether the recipient has
access to adequate child care;0 and (3) whether suitable
employment exists locally.0 5 Recipients can apply for an
unlimited number of extensions, but each extension is
limited to six months and can only be renewed by the
Commissioner, ' 6 up to the federal lifetime limit of five
years.0 7
The legislature established procedural protections and
appeal processes for persons denied extensions which are
different from the procedures for other welfare benefit
terminations.0 " The appeals process for extensions to time
limited benefits follows the general fair hearing rules
except that:
When the subject of an appeal is an adverse action regarding a
request for a[n] ... extension.., the hearing officer shall not
substitute his or her judgment for that of the Commissioner. Such
actions may only be overturned by a hearing officer if it is found
that the Commissioner... has abused his or her discretion when
making the determination on the.., extension request.
0 9
Recipients who are denied extensions have much more
limited appeal rights than those seeking relief from denial
or termination of welfare benefits. Unlike in most welfare
appeals where the hearings officer applies an independent
standard of review (i.e. has the authority to overturn
decisions made by other divisions or personnel of DTA),"0 in
appeals from denial of extensions, the hearing officer can
not "substitute his or her judgment for that of the
102. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210(B)(2)(a).
103. See id. § 203.210(B)(2)(e).
104. See id. § 203.210(B)(2)(d).
105. See id. § 203.210(B)(2)(a).
106. See id. §§ 203.210(D)(2), 203.210(D)(4).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1999).
108. Compare MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 343.610(B), with MASS. REGS.
CODE tit. 106, § 343.610(D).
109. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 343.610(D) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
110. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 18, § 16 (1999) ("Said division shall be under
the supervision of a director appointed by the commissioner and shall be
independent of all other divisions and personnel of the department.").
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Commissioner.""'
The hearing officer has the ability to overturn the
Commissioner's denial of an extension if the Commissioner
has "abused his or her discretion.""2 Once again, recipients
have more limited appeal rights for extension denials than
for regular welfare appeals. In most welfare appeal
hearings, the hearing officer weighs the evidence under a
preponderance of evidence standard,' but for time-limit
extension appeals, the hearing officer must apply an "abuse
of discretion" standard. 4 As the regulations only require
the commissioner to consider certain discretionary criteria
in making her decision,"15 a hearing officer will have a
difficult time proving that the commissioner "abused his or
her discretion.""6
December 1, 1998 marked the first cut-off date for
welfare benefits for approximately 5,100 welfare
recipients." Each month another 500 families reach their
twenty-four month time limit."' By August 30, 1999, close
to 6,000 families had applied for extensions of benefits, of
which only 382 had been granted. 9 One thousand were still
111. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 343.610(D).
112. Id.
113. See id. § 343.610(B); Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Fourth
Report: Justice Denied: A Closer Look at the State's "Fair Hearing Process" for
Massachusetts Families Subject to the Welfare Time Limit,
http://www.gbls.org/gbls/gblsweb.nsf (collected Nov. 23, 1999, 11:28 EST) (on
file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter MLRI
FOURTH REPORT].
114. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 343.610(D).
115. See id. § 203.210(B)(2)(a-e).
116. Id. § 343.610(D); see Anne Paulsen, OP-ED, A Welfare Travesty,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1998, at A27 (explaining the difficulty recipients will
have while seeking extensions to welfare benefits); Doris Sue Wong, Welfare
Appeals Process Criticized, Agency Head's Power At Issue, BOSTON GLOBE
ONLINE,http://wvv.boston.com/dailyglobe/globehtml/195/Welfareappealsprocess
criticized.htm (created July 14, 1998) (on file with the author and with the
Buffalo Law Review) (claiming it will be difficult for a hearing officer to
overturn the Commissioner's decision).
117. See MLRI INTERIM REPORT, supra note 83; Zachary R. Dowdy, State to
Delay Welfare Benefit Cutoff. Some See Compassion; State Blames Red Tape,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1998, at B1 (estimating that 7,100 recipients would
have their benefits terminated).
118. See Department of Transitional Assistance Website,
http://www.state.ma.us/dta/dtatoday/reform/welfarereform-Chapter5.htm
(collected March 6, 2000) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law
Review).
119. See MLRI FOURTH REPORT, supra note 113, n.1
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pending.' According to statistics available in March 1999,
Massachusetts had "the highest rate of denial of
extensions... ," in comparison to the other eleven states in
which welfare recipients had reached their time limits.
1 1
A recent study analyzing the fair hearing process for
extension of benefit requests, revealed that, of the 99
families appealing a denial of extension benefits, 91% lost
their final appeals. According to the study, the primary
reason families lost their appeals was for failure to
participate in a voluntary job search program, 21 a
requirement not listed in the enumerated criteria.124 The
following fair hearing appeal from denial of welfare benefits
extensions decision illustrates the limited effectiveness of
the appeals process under the present regulations.
Facts: A mother who was homeless fulfilled DTA's dual
requirements of searching for housing for four days per week and
doing community service for 20 hours per week. She was also
looking for a job on her own and went once to a structured job
search, which conflicted with these two other obligations. After
being homeless for two years, she had just received a housing
subsidy and testified that she "needs benefits for a few more
months so she can pay for her security deposit, rent and food."
Decision: DTA denied the mother an extension for "fail[ing] to
cooperate with the Department in work related activities." The
four DTA representatives present at the hearing stated that the
mother-who was not represented-was originally denied an
extension because she had not voluntarily participated in
120. See id.
121. Massachusetts Law Reform Institute Documentation Project and the
Family Economic Initiative, Second Report: A Closer Look At The Thousands of
Families Losing Benefits Under the Massachusetts Time Limit,
http://www.gbls.org/gbls/gblsweb.nsf (created Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with the
author and with the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter MLRI SEcOND REPORT].
Appendix A lists the other eleven states: (1) Florida; (2) Nebraska; (3) Oregon;
(4) South Carolina; (5) Virginia; (6) Louisiana; (7) North Carolina; (8)
Connecticut; (9) Texas; (10) Arizona; and (11) Indiana. See id. at Appendix A;
see also Doris Sue Wong, 88% Fail to Receive Cash Aid Extensions, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1999, at B2 (quoting Elizabeth Schott, a senior policy analyst
at the Center for Budget and Policy in Washington D.C. as saying, "I would
definitely put Massachusetts in the pretty harsh end of the spectrum in terms
of its policies and results").
122. See MLRI FOURTH REPORT, supra note 113.
123. See id.
124. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210 (1999).
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structured job search. The hearing officer upheld the termination
of benefits to the family under the new appeal standard that
prohibited him from "substituting his... judgment for that of the
Commissioner.""'
In the above scenario, the mother had fulfilled her work
requirement but was still denied a benefit extension. The
hearing officer could not reverse the Commissioner's
decision because the decision was made under the
Commissioner's discretionary authority.'26  With such
discretionary standards, the hearing officer could not
determine that the recipient should receive an extension
even though the hearing officer could correct the facts on
the record.'27 Although there are procedural protections in
place to appeal denials of extensions, the high standard for
reversal limits the effectiveness of the appeals process.'28
Given the critical nature of the welfare benefit
extension to the lives of many low-income women and
children, and given the discretionary nature of the
extensions process (the Commissioner presently considers
extension requests on a case-by-case factual basis),
procedural due process remains important to ensure that
recipients will not be unfairly denied extensions. In
examining the changes to procedural protections in
Massachusetts since the federal welfare law, it appears
that, although fair hearing processes in Massachusetts
remain in place for welfare benefit sanctions and
terminations, fair hearing regulations that attend
discretionary time limit extension requests do not provide
adequate due process for welfare recipients.
125. MLRI FOURTH REPORT, supra note 113 (hearing decision dated May, 12,
1999) (emphasis added).
126. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
127. See Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Family Economic Initiative
Comments on FY2000 Budget and Administration's Policy with Regard to
TAFDC Time Limit, Letter to Secretary O'Leary, http://www.gbls.org (created
Dec. 18, 1998) (on file with the author and with the Buffalo Law Review)
(explaining that "[e]ven if the hearing officer were to make findings of fact
correcting factual errors in DTA's presentation of the case, in the absence of
standards, there is no set of facts... under which a hearing officer can conclude
an extension must be granted").
128. See MLRI FOURTH REPORT, supra note 113.
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V. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO LIMITS IN PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS: THE MASSACHUSETTS ExAMPLE
Since welfare administration has been devolved to the
states, states may offer a better avenue for asserting an
entitlement in welfare benefits and subsequently
challenging due process violations."9 Assuming TANF
eliminated a federal statutory entitlement to welfare
benefits, welfare recipients can still assert due process
rights through state constitutional provisions, courts and
state legislatures. By establishing an entitlement in state
welfare programs, recipients could claim a property right to
welfare benefits, which would satisfy the first prong of the
due process test, and therefore enable them to effectively
argue for adequate procedural protections.! °
Welfare recipients in states with constitutional
provisions requiring the state to provide assistance to needy
persons can argue that its state constitution gives rise to
attendant procedural protections. 3' Still, even in states
such as Massachusetts, in which courts do not interpret the
state constitution as mandating the state to provide
assistance to needy residents32 welfare recipients may still
have grounds to assert a property interest in welfare
benefits and subsequent due process rights.
It has been argued that a property interest can be found
in a benefit program where there are defined eligibility
criteria in which a person who meets the criteria can
"legitimately expect to receive benefits." 3 Since the
Massachusetts welfare program has defined eligibility
129. See Hershkoff, supra note 9, at 1405 ("In thinking through legal
responses to devolution, we might take a cue from devolution itself and 'think
local.' "). See generally Rava, supra note 64, at 546-47 (explaining state
constitutional protections and their potential for protecting the poor).
130. See supra pp. 569-70 and accompanying notes (describing the two-part
due process framework: i.e. (1) Is there a protected property interest? (2) If yes,
then how much process is due?).
131. See supra p. 575 and accompanying notes. Note that a state
constitutional right can be narrowly interpreted by the courts.
132. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 333 N.E.2d
388, 398 (Mass. 1975) (stating they were "aware of no constitutional obligation
on the State to provide financial assistance to all its needy residents").
133. Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit
Cases in the Block Grant Era, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 104-05 (1996); see
also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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criteria,... recipients may be able to argue that they have a
property interest in the two- year time limited benefits. As I
have mentioned before, lawyers successfully advanced this
argument in a recent Colorado case which established
welfare recipients' entitlement to benefits, despite the "no-
entitlement" language in the federal and state welfare
statutes.35
It has similarly been argued that there is no property
interest in programs with overly discretionary eligibility
standards.' 3  For example, in its analysis of whether
plaintiffs had a property interest in public housing benefits,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained that,
"to the extent the agency.., possesses discretion to decide
whether to grant or withhold the benefit, it becomes less
likely that a potential recipient will be found to have a
constitutionally protected property interest."" ' Under that
analysis, determination of whether the extended benefit
period, although determined on a discretionary basis,"'
could trigger a property interest in the extended benefit will
depend on whether the extended benefit period is seen as a
continuation of the less discretionary two-year welfare
program, or as a separate benefit program."9
134. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
135. See Weston v. Hammons, No. 99-CV-412, at 19 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 1999),
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (on file with the author and with the
Buffalo Law Review).
While benefits may be denied to non-complying participants, that does
not change the mandatory nature of the program for those who do
comply. If the program is fully funded and a participant is in full
compliance with all its requirements ... the participant is entitled to
benefits; nothing in the 'no entitlement' language changes that fact.
Id.
136. See Morawetz, supra note 133, at 104-05; see also Weston, No, 99-CV-
412, at 19 (explaining that one reason the benefit program at issue created a
claim of entitlement was because it did not permit discretion).
137. Madera v. Secretary of Executive Officer of Commonwealth & Dev., 636
N.E.2d 1326, 1330 (Mass. 1994).
138. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
139. Compare MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 203.210(D)(1) (1999) ("The
extension of benefits is not a continuation of the 24 month period of benefits,
but rather a separate, short-term benefit that begins only after the expiration of
the 24-month period or expiration of a previous extension.") with Smith v.
McIntyre, Civ. A. 99-1044, at 18 (Mass. Sup.Ct. Apr. 20, 1999) (Memorandum of
Decision and Order for Judgment on Plaintiffs' Motions for Preliminary
Injunction and Cross Motions for Summary Judgment) (on file with the author
and with the Buffalo Law Review):
In characterizing the extension of benefits as a "separate, short-term"
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If the extended benefit period is seen as an extension to
the original welfare benefit, than recipients have already
met the initial eligibility criteria and therefore should have
a property interest in the extended benefit period. 140 Once
recipients establish a property interest in welfare benefits
they can then argue for constitutional procedural due
process protections. While a property interest does not
guarantee recipients will receive an extension, it does
guarantee that some level of procedural due process will
apply to the benefit extension period.4 1 Conversely, if the
extended period is seen as a separate program, recipients
will have a difficult time establishing a property interest in
the extended period, as eligibility criteria are extremely
discretionary."
Another avenue for establishing and strengthening
procedural due process protections for welfare recipients is
through changing state welfare laws. In the last
Massachusetts state congressional session, two welfare
extension related provisions were presented to the
Governor in the proposed budget. 4 4 Unfortunately, the
Governor vetoed both in the final bill. 45 The first provision
expanded the list of criteria that the Commissioner should
consider when determining extensions and required that
the Commissioner "make such determination in writing."
41
benefit and establishing a preliminary test for financial eligibility in
106 CMR § 203.210(A), the DTA has exceeded the statutory authority
conferred by Chapter 5 .... Thus the extension of benefits, as a matter
of law, is a continuation of benefits for which the DTA has established
eligibility criteria.
Id.
The State is appealing the decision. See Joan Vermochi, The Bay State's Mixed
Message to the Poor Who Work, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1999, at A19.
140. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
144. See H.B. 4900, 181st Gen. Ct., §§ 194, 309 (Mass. 1999) (version
introduced Nov. 10, 1999).
145. See H.B. 4901, 181st Gen. Ct., §§ 194, 309 (Mass. 1999) (version
introduced Nov. 17, 1999).
146. 1999 Mass. Acts 4900, § 194.
Section 194.[REDRAFT S. 107] The fourth paragraph of subsection (i)
of section 110 of chapter 5 of the acts of 1995 is hereby amended by
striking out the second sentence and inserting in place thereof the
following sentence:-[The commissioner shall make such a
determination in writing based on such criteria, which shall] include,
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The second provision would have required "the department
of transitional assistance [to] apply the same standard of
review for all administrative appeals concerning benefits or
waivers under chapter 5 of the acts of 1995 ... ." This
second provision would have curtailed the commissioner's
discretion in determining welfare benefit extensions by
altering the appeals review standard from an abuse of
discretion standard to a preponderance of evidence
standard,'48 although this is not the reason the Governor
vetoed the provision.'49
Although Congress may have eliminated the federal
entitlement to welfare benefits, 5 ' welfare recipients still
have good grounds to assert due process rights to welfare
benefits both through judicial interpretation of state
welfare statutes or through changing the state welfare laws
altogether. 5' While I have focused closely on benefit
extensions in Massachusetts, similar arguments can be
made in regard to welfare programs among the various
states.
CONCLUSION
The 1996 welfare reform law dramatically changed
welfare policy by, among other provisions, imposing a five-
year lifetime limit on benefits.' The law also attempts to
eliminate welfare's entitlement status, which had
previously taken the form of a property right that had given
but not be limited to: (1) whether the recipient has received and or
rejected offers of employment, has quit a job without good cause or has
been fired for cause; (2) the degree to which the recipient has
cooperated and is cooperating with the agency in work-related
activities; [and (3) whether the recipient needs a reasonable amount of
time, as determined by the commissioner, to complete a recognized
education or training program.]
Id. (bracketed material indicates proposed changes to the law).
147. 1999 Mass. Acts 4900, § 309.
148. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
149. "I am vetoing this section, as it would undermine the discretionary
authority of the DTA Commissioner to waive certain requirements for good
cause, as provided under the welfare law." 1999 Mass. Acts 4901, § 309.
150. See discussion supra Part I(b).
151. See discussion supra Parts III & V; see also Hershkoff, supra note 9, at
1404-05 & n.9 (suggesting that federal due process challenges may still be an
option for welfare recipients because it is unlikely the Supreme Court will
revisit the issue and overrule Goldberg v. Kelly).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1999).
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rise to constitutional procedural due process protections.'53
Whether or not Congress effectively eliminated the
procedural due process requirements that had previously
accompanied welfare benefits is, and will continue to be,
worked out through the courts and through state and
federal legislatures. Should welfare benefits not be
considered a federal entitlement, welfare recipients can
attempt to find state entitlements to welfare benefits
through state constitutions and laws.'54 In the meantime,
welfare recipients and advocates have been arguing
effectively for adequate procedural due process protections
throughout the various states.55
In this period of diminishing federal welfare
commitment, it is important that there be effective
standards limiting administrative discretion in determining
welfare eligibility and eligibility for extension of benefits.
Although states may develop adequate procedural
protections for their welfare programs, absent a federal
requirement, states may develop poor processes for welfare
recipients to challenge unfair benefit terminations, denials
or arbitrary denials of extensions to the time limited
benefits. To adequately protect welfare recipients from
unfair treatment, federal and state laws must guarantee
that recipients receive the constitutional procedural due
process protections secured by the Supreme Court thirty
years ago.
153. See discussion supra Part I(a) & I(b).
154. See discussion supra Part IV.
155. See discussion supra Parts II, III & IV.
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